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INTRODUCTION
Imagine: your favorite football team has defied the odds and is playing
in a conference championship game. Fans have filled the stadium, eager
to cheer on their team. Your team fights their hardest, trying to overcome 
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672 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
their “underdog” status. This challenging match turns to overtime, and the
crowd is going wild. In the final seconds of overtime, the referee’s
obviously missed call results in your team’s loss. Not only were the teams
competing against each other, but it seems they were also fighting the
enforcers of the rules. Similarly, businesses across the country have found 
themselves not only fighting their insurance carrier over the existence of
coverage, but also the court system for providing inconsistent and absurd 
applications of the policy in dispute. 
The Pollution Exclusion, included in a standard Commercial General
Liability (CGL) policy, attempts to limit or preclude insurance coverage
for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge of one or 
more pollutants.1 Although the wording of the exclusion clause has not 
changed in decades, it has been inconsistently applied and interpreted by 
courts across the country, sometimes even within a single jurisdiction.2 
After an extensive review and analysis of the entire body of existing 
precedent on the interpretation of this exclusion, the Supreme Court of
Alabama stated, “Rarely has any issue spawned as many, and as variant in
rationales and results, court decisions as has the pollution-exclusion 
clause.”3 This conflict has left policyholders unsure of the applicability of 
the policy to their business activities, and ultimately, the coverage 
available for claims made against them.4 
When faced with a dispute between an insurance carrier and its insured
over applicability and interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion, the
Supreme Court of California evaluated the extensive litigation 
surrounding the scope of the exclusion in other jurisdictions.5 As to the
general nature of the jurisprudence, the court noted, “[t]o say there is a
lack of unanimity as to how the clause should be interpreted is an 
understatement. Although the fragmentation of opinion defies strict
categorization, courts are roughly divided into two camps.”6 More simply
Copyright 2020, by ASHLEY RANDOL.
1. David B. Goodman, Avoiding the Pollution Exclusion in Your CGL
Insurance, GREENSFELDER, (Feb. 23, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.greensfelder
.com/business-risk-management-blog/avoiding-the-pollution-exclusion-in-your-
cgl-insurance-policy [https://perma.cc/MWH6-DK8V].
2. See Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2002).
3. Id. at 800. 
4. Eric Little & Jacquelyn Beaumont, The Absolute Pollution Exclusion:
Navigating Pathways Around Total Confusion, CALL & JENSEN, http://calljensen
.com/the-absolute-pollution-exclusion-navigating-pathways-around-total-confu
sion/ [https://perma.cc/96KX-DAAP] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
5. MacKinnon v. Trucks Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1208 (2003).
6. Id.
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6732020] COMMENT
stated, a jurisdiction’s placement into either camp depends on whether it 
applies a broad or narrow scope of coverage when interpreting the
pollution exclusion.7 
Jurisdictions falling into the first camp are those which apply a narrow 
interpretation of the pollution exclusion. According to the court, this camp
interprets the exclusion to apply “only to traditional environmental 
pollution into the air, water, and soil, but generally not to all injuries
involving the negligent use or handling of toxic substances that occurs in
the normal course of business.”8 To arrive at this interpretation, these
courts typically find ambiguity in the specific wording of the exclusion
when applied to such cases of negligence and interpret this ambiguity in 
favor of coverage for the insured.9 In contrast, the courts with a broader
scope of interpretation maintain that the wording of the exclusion is
unambiguous and applies equally to both the traditional notions of 
environmental pollution and cases of negligence involving toxic
substances.10 This Comment will discuss the body of jurisprudence 
surrounding each camp, including the primary arguments and
considerations adopted by the courts, the methods of interpretation used,
and the reasonableness of the outcomes achieved by each. Additionally, 
this Comment will address the tests developed by the high courts of some
states and consider which of these would be the most effective uniform 
interpretation.
Part I of this Comment will introduce the Commercial General
Liability policy, including its application and limitations. It will also
discuss the Pollution Exclusion, including the evolution and modern
application of this exclusion clause. Part II will introduce the issue at hand,
primarily the divide between the two camps categorized as by the 
California Supreme Court in MacKinnon v. Trucks Insurance Exchange.
Part III will discuss the Louisiana Supreme Court’s approach to this
highly-litigated topic, as addressed in Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corporation.
Part IV will propose a solution to this problem: a test for uniform
interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE GAME
The Pollution Exclusion is a clause contained in a Commercial
General Liability (CGL) policy that attempts to limit or preclude insurance
coverage under the policy for bodily injury or property damage arising due 
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1209.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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674 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
to one or more pollutants.11 To understand the implications of this
exclusion, this section will introduce the practical function of the CGL
policy, and the evolution of the exclusion clause contained therein. 
A. The CGL Policy
A Commercial General Liability insurance policy provides broad
coverage to business entities for injuries encountered in the everyday
course of business.12 The policies are purchased by both large and small 
business owners in an attempt to protect against losses that may result from 
unforeseen liability-imposing events or circumstances.13 Due to the
comprehensive nature of coverage under this policy type, it is typically the
first line of coverage purchased by a business to protect against liability 
for general business risks.14 
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) is an organization that develops
the standard policy forms used by most insurance carriers.15 This
organization ensures that the policy language provided to each carrier 
complies with regulatory and statutory requirements and files necessary
policy information with state regulators on the carrier’s behalf.16 Although
specific language may vary slightly among the states,17 the ISO form is 
11. Id. at 1210.
12. Michael W. Peters, Note, Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability: A
Plain Meaning Approach to the Pollution Exclusion Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J.
161, 166 (1987) (“The purpose of standard CGL insurance is to provide the
insured with the broadest spectrum of protection against liability for unintentional
and unexpected personal injury or property damage arising out of the conduct of
the insured’s business.”).
13. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 127 (La. 2000).
14. Kenneth Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance,
87 VA. L. REV. 85 (2001).
15. Insurance Policy Programs, VERISK, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/
capabilities/actuarial/insurance-policy-programs/# [https://perma.cc/D77S-NE78]
(last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018). The McCarran-Ferguson Act was
enacted in 1945 to outline the regulation of the insurance industry. The Act 
requires individual states to be responsible for the regulation of insurance within
their state and allows insurance carriers to be held largely exempt from federal
antitrust laws. Individual state regulators and insurance boards approve policy
language for carriers, which has led to some variance in the policy language
among states.
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considered standard for the industry.18 For that reason, general discussion 
of policy language and history in this Comment will be that of the
published ISO forms.
In broad terms, the insuring agreement is a contract between an insurer
and an insured whereby the insurer agrees to perform if some uncertain
event comes about, in exchange for a certain sum of money.19 The sum 
paid in advance by the insured is called the premium.20 The subject matter 
of the contract is called the risk.21 Within commercial general liability 
policy type, there are two main categories. The first category is comprised
of those policies considered to be “all risk” in that they generally cover 
losses from any type of peril that is not specifically excluded.22 In contrast,
the second category is those policies considered “named-perils” which
only covers specific perils listed in the policy.23 
When a business organization is faced with liability for an alleged 
injury requiring restitution, a claim is filed with the insurance carrier for 
indemnification. The “trigger of coverage,” or the event that might activate
insurance, has long been understood as the occurrence of bodily injury or 
property damage during the policy period.24 Coverage litigation arises
18. “The close relation between premium rates and forms of policies means
that the same associations that aggregate and analyze claims experience also draft
and license the use of policy forms. . . . In the area of commercial liability insurance,
the largest United States association is the Insurance Services Office (ISO).” 
Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
19. Craig Stanovich, A High-Level View of the CGL, INT’L RISK MGMT.
INSTI., https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/a-high-level-view-of-
the-cgl-policy [https://perma.cc/GQ7K-EUZ7] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
20. Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Insurance Co., 826 A.2d 310, 315 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
21. Id.
22. Robert Cornejo, What does Contamination Mean? The Second Circuit’s
Approach to an Insurance Policy’s Contamination Exclusion, 15 MO. ENVTL. L.
POL’Y REV. 171, 178 (2007).
23. Id.
24. Global Warming Litigation and Insurance Coverage: Emerging Issues, 
SIMPSON THACHER (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/
cold-fusion-existing-content/publications/pub601.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc
/P7CU-US7M]. The “trigger” is the event itself, which triggers the seeking of
coverage. The insurance industry adopted the “occurrence-based” CGL policy in
1966 which allows the insured to be covered if the occurrence of bodily injury or 
property damage happens within the policy period, even if the claim is made after
the policy period. Craig. F. Stanovich, The Claims-Made CGL Policy, INT’L RISK
MGMT. INSTI., https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/the-claims-
made-cgl-policy#1 [https://perma.cc/CR6G-GTRE] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
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676 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
when the insured and the insurer do not agree on the existence of coverage
for the given claim.25 
1. The Pollution Exclusion
The standard form CGL policy includes a clause that aims to limit or
preclude coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by 
pollution. This exclusionary clause generally attempts to exclude coverage
that is afforded by the broad application of the CGL. 
a. Origin of the Pollution Exclusion 
The pollution exclusion was first introduced to CGL policies in the 
early 1970s.26 This exclusion was contained in a popular endorsement, and 
therefore, was not included in the policy itself.27 The 1973 CGL form 
published by the ISO was the first to incorporate this exclusion into the 
basic policy.28 This new exclusion read: 
This insurance does not apply . . . 
. . .
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gasses, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon 
land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release 
or escape is sudden and accidental.29 
25. Global Warming Litigation and Insurance Coverage: Emerging Issues,
supra note 24.
26. Abraham, supra note 14.
27. An endorsement to an insurance policy is an amendment or addition to
the contract which may alter the terms or scope of the original policy. Mila Araujo,
What is an Insurance Endorsement?, THEBALANCE.COM, https://www.thebalance
.com/insurance-endorsement-or-rider-2645729 [https://perma.cc/M3H4-NYKY] 
(last updated Oct. 31, 2019).
28. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the
“Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party
Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
29. Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in
Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor 
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  323 5/21/20  8:23 AM






      
   






   
 
 













    
    
 
 
   
      
 
 
   
     
 
6772020] COMMENT
This initial exclusion was known as the Sudden and Accidental Pollution 
Exclusion (SAPE), the Qualified Pollution Exclusion, or the Conditional
Pollution Exclusion, and was a standard exclusion included in all CGL
policies published by the ISO until 1986. Hereinafter, this version of the 
exclusion will be referred to as the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion.30 As shown above, this version of the pollution exclusion states 
that all pollution claims were excluded from coverage unless the discharge
of the pollutant was “sudden and accidental.” 
Throughout the late 1960s until the early 1980s, there was a dramatic 
shift in the way society viewed pollution. Rachel Carson’s 1962 book,
Silent Spring, alarmed readers across the United States about the dangers
of pesticides and the chemical industry, and set the stage for the impending 
environmental movement.31 Environmental catastrophes slowly became
commonplace and attracted the attention of the press: in 1969, miles of the 
Santa Barbara, California coastline were devastated by an oil spill, killing 
birds and various wildlife living in the area; on June 22, 1969, the 
Cuyohoga River, near Cleveland, Ohio, burst into flames nearly five-
stories high when oil-soaked debris floating on the surface was sparked by 
a passing train.32 Time Magazine published a cover photo of a prior fire
that also occurred on the Cuyohoga River and discussed the impact of
industrial dumping into the nation’s rivers.33 Time wrote that the river 
“oozes rather than flows” and that it contained “no sign of visible life.”34 
The following decade brought sweeping federal response to environmental
catastrophes. 
In December of 1980, during the final days of his term as president, 
Jimmy Carter signed into law the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (known as CERCLA or
of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (citing 1973 
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, reprinted in Tod I. Zuckerman
& Mark C. Raskoff, Environmental Insurance Litigation Practice Forms Form VI-
2, at VI-23 (1995)) (emphasis added). 
30. John C. Sullivan & Rick Perdian, US Environment Law and its Impact on




32. Jennifer Latson, The Burning River That Sparked a Revolution, TIME
(June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/ [https://perma.cc/PJ8E-
R9CJ].
33. Id.
34. America’s Sewage System and the Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 01,
1969.
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678 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
“Superfund”).35 The primary goal of CERCLA was to address the prompt
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and impose liability for cleanup costs on 
responsible parties.36 This goal was established using two primary
mechanisms: (1) a federal fund, financed by the establishment of a tax on 
the chemical and petroleum industries, appropriations from general
revenues, and certain costs and penalties recovered by the federal
government; and (2) a liability scheme whereby the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was given authority to clean up uncontrolled or 
abandoned hazardous waste sites,37 seek out responsible parties,
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs),38 and recover remediation costs 
from PRPs.39 CERCLA imposed retroactive, strict,40 joint and several
liability for the cost of cleanup on any past or present owner or operator of
a site, and on any off-site party who generated any hazardous materials
deposited at a site.41 Sites requiring remediation were placed on the
National Priorities List,42 and liability was imposed on the PRPs for the
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Pub. L. No. 96-510).
36. Sullivan & Perdian, supra note 30. 
37. Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (Superfund): 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1980), ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-comprehensive-environ
mental-response-compensation-and-liability-act [https://perma.cc/CZ5D-L3EP]
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
38. Vocabulary Catalog, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://iaspub.epa
.gov/sor_internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/glossariesandkeywordlists/s 
earch.do?details=&glossaryName=Environmental%20Glossary [https://perma.cc
/6KU6-Y6DB] (last visited Jan. 8, 2020). (“A Potentially Responsible Party is:
Any individual or company--including owners, operators, transporters or 
generators--potentially responsible for, or contributing to a spill or other 
contamination at a Superfund site. Whenever possible, through administrative and 
legal actions, EPA requires PRPs to clean up hazardous sites they have
contaminated.”). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2018).
39. Hamel, supra note 29.
40. (“We agree with the State, however, that section 9607(a) (1)
unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which 
there is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.”). See New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2018); See Superfund Liability, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-liability [https://perma.cc/
9JG7-U684] (last visited Oct 23, 2019).
42. The National Priorities List is the list of sites of national priority among the
known releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants throughout the United States and its territories. The NPL is intended
primarily to guide the EPA in determining which sites warrant further investigation.
See Superfund: National Priorities List, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  325 5/21/20  8:23 AM



















     
 
  
   
 
        
 
 
   
   
    












   
   
 
    
6792020] COMMENT
site contamination.43 The EPA sent “Notice of Liability” letters to
responsible parties, outlining their legal obligation to clean up the
contaminated sites.44 
Parties found liable by the EPA for remediation and cleanup turned to
their insurance carriers and CGL policies to offset the burden of loss, 
seeking defense from government orders and the payment of remediation 
costs.45 Insurers attempted to deny coverage for the claims, taking the
position that the CGL policy excluded damage caused by pollution, unless 
the pollution was sudden and accidental.46 Courts were tasked with 
interpreting the ambiguity of this policy exclusion. Ultimately, the 
qualifications of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion failed to
protect insurers from the liability of cleanup costs and coverage litigation 
covered the court system, based on the ambiguity of “sudden and 
accidental”47 and its broad application to environmental damage incurred 
over decades of industrial practices.48 Insurance carriers were left on the
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list-npl [https://perm
a.cc/KJV8-TGUD] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
43. The EPA employed a “Hazard Ranking System” to score a site based on
actual or potential release of hazardous substances, with scores ranging from 0-100.
A score of 28.5 would land the site on the NPL. See Superfund Site Assessment 
Process, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-
site-assessment-process [https://perma.cc/4V3T-R54F] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
44. Craig Stanovich, The CGL Pollution Exclusion, INT’L RISK MGMT. INSTI., 
https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/the-cgl-pollution-exclusion [https:
//perma.cc/3W8R-8BFY] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 126 (La. 2000) (citing Lee
R. Russ, Couch on Insurance § 127:3 (3d ed. 2003)) (“As this legislation was
enforced, considerable litigation ensued over the possible existence of coverage 
under the standard CGL policy, and, more particularly, over the meaning of the 
‘sudden and accidental’ exception to the general pollution exclusion then en 
vogue.”). (“So long as the ultimate loss was neither expected nor intended, courts
generally extended coverage to all pollution-related damage, even if it arose from
the intentional discharge of pollutants.”) See New Castle Cty. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1196–97 (3d Cir. 1991).
48. A Pollution Exclusion clause was held inapplicable for damages caused 
by an oil spill. The spill was the result of intentional acts of vandals to a tanker
owned by Lansco, Inc., resulting in damage to New Jersey’s Hackensack River 
and surrounding bodies of water. The New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection required Lansco to remediate the damage caused by the environmental
contamination. Lansco sought by declaratory judgment an order to compel their 
general liability carrier to defend any and all claims made by the State and 
indemnify Lansco for the cost of remediation. The court found a duty to defend
342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd  326 5/21/20  8:23 AM






   
   
 




   
    
  
    
 
      
    
    
  




   
 
 
   
   
   
     






680 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
hook for these monumental cleanup costs, the exact kind they hoped to 
side-step with the creation of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution 
Exclusion.49 The result of this unexpected and overwhelming burden on 
the insurance industry resulted in a liability insurance crisis in the mid-
1980s.50 In an attempt to recover from this crisis, the ISO established the
Absolute Pollution Exclusion in 1986.51 
and indemnify, holding that the spillage was sudden and accidental
notwithstanding that it was caused by the intentional acts of third parties. It noted 
that the common meaning of “sudden” is “happening without previous notice or
on very brief notice; unforeseen; unexpected; unprepared for. Webster’s New
International Dictionary, (2 ed. unabr. 1954); Black’s Law Dictionary, (4 ed.
1968),” and stated that “whether the occurrence is accidental must be viewed from 
the standpoint of the insured, and since the oil spill was neither expected nor
intended by Lansco, it follows that the spill was sudden and accidental under the 
exclusion clause even if caused by the deliberate act of a third party.” Jackson
Twp. Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 992–93 
(N.J. Super. L. Div. 1982) (citing Lansco, Inc. v. Envtl. Protec., 350 A.2d 520 
(N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976)).
49. See Abraham, supra note 14 at 94, 95 (citing Milton Russell et al., 
Hazardous Waste Remediation: The Task Ahead, at A3.6-7 (1991)); A.M. BEST
CO., BEST’S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY CASUALTY 2 (1991) (“ . . .
within a decade estimates of the total cost of Superfund (as well as cleanup under
analogous state liability regimes) exceeded $500 billion. At that time, the total 
surplus (in effect, net worth) of the American property/casualty insurance industry 
was roughly twenty-five percent of this figure.”).
50. One article explains that incident in the following way:
From late 1984 to mid-1986, the liability insurance industry was
characterized by dramatic changes in the pricing and availability of 
insurance coverage. Premiums in commercial casualty lines of insurance 
rose by hundreds of percent for some policies. Limits on coverage in 
many policies were reduced to a fraction of potential losses and insurers 
stopped covering some types of risks and entire lines altogether. 
Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance
Markets, 5 YALE J. REG. 455 (1988).
51. Stempel, supra note 28, at 2. See also MacKinnon v. Trucks Ins. Exch.,
73 P.3d 1205, 1211 (Cal. 2003) (“Commentators have pointed as well to the
passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA; 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.) in 1980 and the attendant 
expansion of liability for remediating hazardous wastes (see AIU Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 807, 815-816 [274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253
(AIU Ins. Co.)] as motivation for amending the exclusion.”). 
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b. The Modern Pollution Exclusion 
In 1986, the Insurance Services Office introduced the Absolute
Pollution Exclusion to the standard CGL policy form. This revision
removed the exclusion’s “sudden and accidental” language in an attempt to
avoid judicial interpretation that coverage was required for environmental
contamination caused by gradual, but unintentional, pollution.52 Since its
inception, the terms of the revised Pollution Exclusion have remained 
intact.53 This revision was an attempt by insurers to avoid liability for
pollution events and the uncertainty associated with the term “pollution” and
ambiguous phrasing. However, this issue continued to be the subject of 
litigation between insurers and the insureds.54 Hereinafter, the Absolute 
Pollution Exclusion will be referred to as the “pollution exclusion.”
B. Insurance Policy Interpretation
“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a 
living thought and may vary greatly in color according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used” – Oliver Wendell Holmes
Professor Allan Farnsworth, one of the leading authorities on contract
law, discussed the court’s role in interpretation of the policy, stating, “[t]he
concern of a court is not with the truth of this language but with the
expectations that it aroused in the parties.”55 Before a court analyzes the
specific language of an insurance policy, the court typically determines
whether the terms of the policy are ambiguous.56 Many courts do not
conduct further analysis beyond the plain text of the insurance policy if
these terms are found to be unambiguous.57 This is a conclusion finding
52. Stempel, supra note 28, at 1–2.
53. Mark Bell, The Elusive “Pollution” Definition in the CGL Policy, INT’L
RISK MGMT. INSTI., https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/pollution-
definition-in-the-cgl-policy [https://perma.cc/CA47-WWY5] (last visited Nov. 1, 
2019).
54. Christopher Meeks, Note, The Pollution Delusion: A Proposal for a 
Uniform Interpretation of Pollution in General Liability Absolute Pollution 
Exclusions, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 830 (2009).
55. E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, § 7.10 at 511 (2d 
ed. 1990).
56. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, §30:4 (4th ed. 1999).
57. (“It is a generally accepted proposition that where the terms if a writing 
are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or construction, 
since the only purpose if judicial construction is to remove doubt and
uncertainty.”) Id.
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682 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
that “the language of the exclusion is unambiguous, that it plainly applies
to the kind of factual scenario presented here, and that no consideration of 
the history of the clause or of other contextual or explanatory materials is 
required or appropriate.58 
Although different tests are used to determine ambiguity in an 
insurance policy, the same basic principle is consistent among the states:
if the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning. Conversely, if the terms of the policy 
are susceptible to more than one meaning, they are considered ambiguous
and will be construed against the insurer who drafted the policy.59 The
overwhelming divide between courts over the exact meaning of the terms 
used in a pollution exclusion is evidence that these terms can be given a 
plethora of meanings. 
Courts adopting a broad interpretation of the exclusion, often 
excluding coverage for injuries caused outside of the realm of traditional 
environmental pollution, find the terms of the contract to be unambiguous 
and, thus, do not consider other factors such as intent, insured
expectations, and the history of the exclusion.60 In contrast, the courts who 
find the terms of the exclusion clause to be ambiguous then extend the
investigation beyond the four corners of the policy.61 Thus, this discussion 
requires an analysis of how doctrinal principles are applied and considered 
by courts when giving meaning to the policy after finding the exclusion 
ambiguous.
1. Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation
The doctrine of reasonable expectation is a well-established rule of
insurance policy construction pointing to interpretation in favor of 
58. Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310 (2003).
59. (“To be unambiguous, a contract must be reasonably capable of only one
construction; in other words, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite 
or certain meaning as a matter of law.”) Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut
Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 107–08, 180 Ill Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 2014 (1992). (“A
contract is ambiguous if a genuine doubt appears as to its meaning, that is if, after
applying established rules of interpretation, the written instrument remains 
reasonably susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings . . . .”)
LORD, supra note 56. (“The terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous only if 
the policy’s provisions are reasonably susceptible to two or more constructions or
there is reasonable doubt or confusion as to their meaning”) Porterfield v. 
Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d 789, 799 (Ala. 2002).
60. Deni Assocs. of Fla. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 711 So. 2d 1135,
1139 (Fla. 1998).
61. Stempel, supra note 28, at 1. 
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6832020] COMMENT
coverage.62 This doctrine holds that a policy should be interpreted in 
accordance with a policyholder’s reasonable expectations of coverage.63 
As propounded by Judge Keeton, this modern doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is based upon a two-pronged rationale: 
(1) that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage 
in an insurance contract; and,
(2) that the reasonable expectations of the insurance applicants
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts should be honored, even though a painstaking study of 
the policy provisions contractually would negate those 
expectations.64 
Furthermore, Judge Keeton assessed that “expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations.”65 While some courts consider this
doctrine to govern policy interpretation, others will take the policyholders
expectations into consideration when analyzing the application as a 
whole.66 Courts use this doctrine to ultimately limit the scope of these
complicated clauses.67 
Policyholders often expect insurance coverage when liability arises
from an injury related to materials potentially covered by a CGL policy.68 
However, insurers attempt to apply broad definitions to the terms of the 
pollution exclusion to deny coverage for those claims.69 There is a
disconnect between insurers and policyholders regarding this expectation, 
pertaining to the pollution exclusion.70 This detached understanding of
62. Hamel, supra note 29, at 1106. 
63. Id. at 1107.
64. Peter Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORTS & INS. L.J. 729, 733 (2000).
65. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provision, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
66. (“The scope of [the] Pollution Exclusion is governed by the expectation 
of a reasonable policyholder.”). Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 104 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Ill. 1952)).
67. Gail S. M. Evans & Ursula Spilger, Just What is Pollution? The Evolution
of the Pollution Exclusion on Liability Insurance Coverage for Losses, S. L.J. 179,
186 (2009).
68. Meeks, supra note 54, at 825.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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policy coverage by insureds potentially leads to costly litigation and 
because of competing interpretations of the Pollution Exclusion by courts 
nationwide can result in forum shopping.
2. Intent of the Drafter
It is clear the pollution exclusion was born from an environmental
movement and has experienced a dramatic and controversial evolution.71 
The pollution exclusion clause was formulated as a response to the
insurance industry’s overwhelming liability resulting from environmental 
disasters.72 
In American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois considered the original intent, stating:
[T]he 1986 amendment to the exclusion was wrought, not to 
broaden the provision’s scope beyond its original purpose of 
excluding coverage for environmental pollution, but rather to 
remove the “sudden and accidental” exception to coverage which, 
as noted above, resulted in a costly onslaught of litigation. We 
would be remiss, therefore, if we were to simply look to the bare 
words of the exclusion, ignore its raison d’ etre, and apply it to 
situations which do not remotely resemble traditional 
environmental contamination. The Pollution Exclusion has been,
and should continue to be, the appropriate means of avoiding “the
yawning extent of potential liability arising from the gradual or
repeated discharge of hazardous substances into the environment.”
Further, “[w]e think it improper to extend the exclusion beyond 
that arena.”73 
3. Public Policy
The doctrine of public policy incorporates the aspects of justice with
the goals, purposes, and reasons for laws. This doctrine understands a
limitation on the actions to enforce a right or protect an interest that is not 
in the interest of the public overall.74 These doctrines mentioned above are 
not comprehensive, and the list is certainly not exhaustive. To the extent 
that an inquiry into those mentioned doctrines does not yield a definitive 
answer, a court may then look to public policy issues to compel a certain
71. See discussion supra Part I.
72. Id.
73. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 81. 
74. Public Policy, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk. Ed. 2012).
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6852020] COMMENT
construction. Thus, public policy is a secondary principle, consulted when 
stronger arguments fail. A public policy argument would ensure the protection
of American insurance consumers from misleading representations put forth
by the insurance industry, in the form of the pollution exclusion clause.75 
Insurers must express the change in effect of a Commercial General Liability
policy with candor when new policy language is implemented.76 As a matter 
of fair representation, an insurance carrier cannot claim the coverage of this
policy is far-reaching and protective, while simultaneously attempting to
remove a range of coverage with one exclusion. To encourage honesty and 
fairness within the industry, insurers should not be permitted to hide behind 
the pollution exclusion to avoid providing customers with the very thing they
were promised: insurance.
4. Absurdity of Result
Finally, an additional factor that courts have chosen to consider when 
limiting the scope of the pollution exclusion is the absurdity of the result
produced by their decision.77 Using the absurdity of result consideration
can provide a court with the means of avoiding the worst pitfalls of the 
textual-literal approach.78 However, the application of this concept is 
questionable.79 Professor Jeffrey Stempel, who has written extensively on
insurance coverage litigation and the pollution exclusion, articulated a 
“working yardstick” for applying the absurd result test.80 The following 
states the test:
An absurd result ensues when an insurance policy exclusion, if
read literally, or construed broadly, would preclude coverage in
situations where the claims arise for relatively common mishaps.
In the course of the insured’s normal operations and where the
nature of the underlying claim does not fundamentally fit the 
purpose for which the exclusion was incorporated into the policy. 
75. Hamel, supra note 29, at 1122.
76. Id. at 1087.
77. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Milgen Dev., Inc., 297 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974). (“Like other contracts, contracts of insurance should receive a
construction that is practical and reasonable as well as just. If one interpretation,
viewed with the other provisions of the contract and its general object and scope,
would lead to an absurd conclusion, that interpretation must be abandoned . . . .”). 
78. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case Study of the Wrong 
Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance Pollution Exclusion, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 463, 522 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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686 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Literal or broad construction of a policy provision, either to create 
or deny coverage creates an absurd result where the resulting
decision is negated by the objectively reasonable expectations of 
either insurer or insured, or where finding coverage is inconsistent 
with the purpose of the insurance agreement, the function of 
insurance, or public policy.81 
II. ISSUE: WHEN THE REFS PICK A FAVORITE
The pollution exclusion included in most Commercial General
Liability policies excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage
caused by “pollution,” a term which is defined as an irritant or 
contaminant, whether in solid, liquid, or gaseous form, including—when
they can be regarded as an irritant or contaminant—smoke, vapor, soot, 
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.82 There is currently a wide 
disparity among courts nationwide in the interpretation of this clause.83 A 
universal application of the exclusion is a seemingly intangible goal,
drifting further and further away from policyholders. The lack of
consensus among the courts has created abounding confusion, primarily
in defining the terms “pollution” and “pollutant.”84 In referencing the
application of this exclusion, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Porterfield 
v. Audubon Indemnity Co. stated: “[o]ur review and analysis of the entire 
body of existing precedent reveals that there exists not just a split of
authority, but an absolute fragmentation of authority.”85 As previously 
noted, judicial stances on the application of this clause tend to belong to 
one of two categories,86 namely: a “literal” approach and a “situational”
approach.87 This Part will discuss these two competing approaches and the
outcomes of each.
81. Id. at 523.
82. Pollution Exclusion, INT’L RISK MGMT. INSTI., https://www.irmi.com/
term/insurance-definitions/pollution-exclusion [https://perma.cc/G5LU-8MHN] 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
83. See Porterfield v. Audbon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d 800 (Ala. 2002).
84. Bell, supra note 53. 
85. Porterfield, 856 So. 2d at 800.
86. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1208–09 (2003)
(explaining the division of authority).
87. Apana v. TIG Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2009).
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A. The Narrow, “Situational” Approach
The narrow approach is one that “maintains that the exclusion applies 
only to traditional environmental pollution into the air, water, and soil, but
generally not to all injuries involving the negligent use or handling of toxic 
substances that occur in the normal course of business.”88 Jurisdictions
applying this approach to insurance policy interpretation look to factual
context and typically uphold the exclusion only in cases of traditional
environmental pollution.89 
The result of interpretations consistent with this approach is most often
the finding of insurance coverage because the damage was not the result
of the “discharge of a pollutant.”90 Therefore, this is arguably a pro-insured 
interpretation. The following cases are examples of those which have
applied this narrow method.
1. MacKinnon v. Trucks Insurance Exchange 
In MacKinnon v. Trucks Insurance Exchange, Trucks Insurance 
Exchange issued a CGL policy to insured John R. MacKinnon for a policy 
period of April 1996 to April 1997, covering an apartment building that 
MacKinnon owned and operated.91 Following a tenant’s request for the
extermination of yellow jackets, MacKinnon hired Antimite Associates,
Inc., an exterminator, to treat the apartment building on several occasions
88. MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1205, 1208–09.
89. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 2012).
90. MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1208.
91. Concerning the policy, the following was stated in that case:
That policy “obligated the insurer to pay all sums for which [the insured]
become[s] legally obligated to pay as damages caused by bodily injury, 
property damage or personal injury.” The insurer must “pay for damages
up to the Limit of Liability when caused by an occurrence arising out of 
the business operations conducted at the insured location.” Under
“Exclusions” the policy states: “We do not cover Bodily Injury or
Property Damage (2) Resulting from the actual, alleged, or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants: (a) at or from the
insured location.” The terms “Pollution or Pollutants” are defined, in the
definitions section at the beginning of the policy, as “mean[ing] any 
solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste materials. 
Waste materials include materials which are intended to be or have been 
recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.”).
Id. at 1207.
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688 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
between 1995 and 1996.92 Jennifer Denzin, a tenant in MacKinnon’s 
building, died in the building in May of 1996 and her parents promptly 
filed a wrongful death suit against MacKinnon and Antimite.93 Denzin’s
parents alleged that on or about May 13, 1996, defendants negligently
failed to inform Denzin that her apartment was to be sprayed with 
“dangerous chemicals,” and failed to evacuate her, as a result of which she
died from pesticide exposure.94 Trucks Insurance continued to represent
MacKinnon under a reservation of rights95 while investigating the matter
to determine if coverage existed under the CGL.96 In June 1998, Trucks
Insurance concluded its investigation and informed MacKinnon that 
coverage was precluded under the pollution exclusion clause in his CGL
policy.97 MacKinnon subsequently brought a coverage action against
Trucks Insurance, claiming he was owed a duty to defend and indemnify
in the Denzin action.98 This action reached the California Supreme Court
in 2003. The court noted the extensive litigation surrounding the
exclusion.99 In an attempt to clear the confusion, the court determined that
the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and offered a uniform analysis and
interpretation of the clause, rejecting Trucks Insurance’s argument for a 
broad, sweeping interpretation and coverage preclusion claim.100 In this
decision, the court considered the absurdity of the results, the principles of
contract interpretation, and the familiar connotations of the words used in 
the exclusion.101 Thus, the California Supreme Court adopted a narrow
interpretation and outlined the necessary considerations for insurance 
coverage interpretation, with respect to the exclusionary clause,




95. The following is a definition of Reservation of Rights:
An insurer’s notification to an insured that coverage for a claim may not 
apply. Such notification allows an insurer to investigate (or even defend)
a claim to determine whether coverage applies (in whole or in part) 
without waiving its right to later deny coverage based on information
revealed by the investigation . . . .
INT’L RISK MGMT. INSTI., https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/
reservation-of-rights [https://perma.cc/Q8Q6-P4TX] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
96. MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1207.
97. Id. at 1208.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1216.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1212. 
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6892020] COMMENT
2. Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance Co.
The Stoney Run Company was a New York partnership that owned 
the Stoney Run Apartment Complex.103 The real estate agent for the
complex is a Virginia corporation, known as the Larrymore
Organization.104 Prudential LMI Commercial Insurance Company issued 
two CGL policies to Stoney Run Co and the Larrymore Organization
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in connection with the Stoney Run 
Apartments.105 During the policy period, several tenants at the complex 
were killed or injured allegedly due to the inhalation of carbon monoxide, 
which was emitted directly into their apartments due to faulty heating and 
ventilation systems.106 Subsequent actions were filed by victims or their
legal representatives against the owners of the apartment complex.107 
Stoney Run turned to Prudential to handle liability under the protection of 
their CGL policy.108 Prudential denied coverage, claiming the harm was
caused by the discharge of pollution, and thus excluded under the policy.109 
The plaintiffs brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York against Prudential LMI for an alleged 
obligation, pursuant to the CGL policy, “to defend and/or indemnify” the
plaintiffs with respect to the civil actions brought against them.110 The
district court applied a broad interpretation, holding that carbon monoxide
poisoning clearly fell within the scope of the pollution exclusion clause.111 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed this action de novo.112 
Applying New York law, the court held that the pollution exclusion was
ambiguous as applied to the facts of this case, reversing the decision of the 
district court.113 The court relied on the exact wording of the exclusion in 
the policy, focusing on terms such as “dispersal” and “discharge,” which
they reasoned are most commonly used within the context of 
environmental law, “in reference to injuries caused by disposal or











113. Id. at 39.
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690 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
containment of hazardous waste.”114 In referencing the scope of the clause
as applied to the facts of this case the court held:
[T]he reasonable interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion clause 
is that it applies only to environmental pollution, and not to all 
contact with substances that can be classified as pollutants. We 
hold that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not 
the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the Pollution 
Exclusion clause.115 
This court’s interpretation falls into the situational category for applying a 
narrow interpretation, focusing on the traditional notions of environmental
pollution and the definition of “pollutant.” 
B. The Broad, “Literal” Approach
The second category of judicial interpretation consists of “[holding] 
the exclusion to be an unambiguous contract provision, applying a broad
reading and allowing preclusion of coverage for all claims even relatively
involving a toxic substance.”116 This interpretation does not consider
whether the alleged injury is the result of conventional types of pollution 
to soil, land, air, or water, or whether it is the result of negligence in the 
course of business that involved exposure or interactions with harmful
substances.117 In contrast to their judicial counterparts, these courts apply 
a broad interpretation and find that coverage for the insured is precluded 
because the alleged harm was the result of the discharge of pollution.118 
Where a substance is acting in any manner as an “irritant or contaminant,” 
damage caused thereby is excluded from coverage.119 Thus, this “camp” is
pro-insurer. The following cases are examples of those which have applied 
this broad method.
1. Hog’s Breath Saloon & Restaurant: Quantity Matters
As their standard business practice, Hog’s Breath Saloon & Restaurant 
(Hog’s Breath) employees regularly emptied large amounts of cooking
grease into the sewer drain outside of the restaurant.120 Over time, this
114. Id. at 38. 
115. Id.
116. See MacKinnon v. Trucks Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Cal. 2003).
117. Little & Beaumont, supra note 4.
118. MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1209.
119. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 850 (Ind. 2012).
120. Roinestad v. Kirkpatrick, 300 P.3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2010).
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grease congealed in the city’s sewer system, creating a five-to-eight-foot
clog in the line.121 Sewer clogs create stagnant water, which in turn, can 
produce hydrogen sulfide as a poisonous gas.122 When two city employees
discovered this clog, they inserted a water jet tool in an attempt to remove
the blockage; the first employee was overcome by the gas, lost
consciousness, and tumbled into the manhole.123 The second employee
was then overcome as well, as he tried to rescue his co-worker from the 
viscous obstruction.124 Once the clog was traced back to the practice of
Hog’s Breath, the two workers sued the restaurant in Colorado district
court for their injuries, citing a city ordinance which prohibited the
discharge of garbage or waste into the sewer line in amounts which will
cause an obstruction.125 Naturally, Hog’s Breath turned the claim in to their
insurance carrier, for coverage under their Commercial General Liability 
policy.126 
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company (Mountain States) issued 
a CGL policy to Tim Kirkpatrick d/b/a Hog’s Breath Saloon &
Restaurant.127 Upon receipt of this claim, Mountain States originally
defended the suit under a reservation of rights, while they continued to 
investigate the claim and determine if coverage was applicable under the 
CGL. Mountain States ultimately obtained a judgment declaring it had no
duty to provide coverage to Hog’s Breath,128 citing the coverage was
excluded under the pollution exclusion of the policy.129 The federal court
in this case was to determine whether cooking oil and grease qualified as 
“contaminants” within the meaning of the policy. Turning to the dictionary 





125. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Roinestad, 296 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Colo.
2013).
126. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, No. 06-cv-00221, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67420, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2007).
127. Id.
128. Id. at *13.
129. The CGL issued to Hog’s Breath stated: 
This insurance does not apply to . . . “Bodily injury” . . . arising out of 
the . . . discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
pollutants . . . . Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or 
thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be
recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Id. (emphasis added).
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692 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
soil and stain and otherwise made the sewer unfit for use, the cooking oil 
and grease were contaminants and the insurer was not obligated to provide
coverage.130 
The employees were eventually granted summary judgment in the suit 
against Hog’s Breath and served a writ of garnishment on its insurer. 
Because the employees were not parties to the declaratory judgment
action, the decision was not binding on them. The Colorado district court 
agreed with Mountain States that coverage was barred under the pollution 
exclusion clause, but an appellate court reversed and remanded the case
for garnishment, finding that the exclusion was ambiguous insofar as its 
application to the grease used to cook food in.131 
The Colorado Supreme Court set a new precedent in rendering a
decision on the facts of this case.132 The court found that the ordinary 
definition of “contaminant” probably covers “cooking grease . . . when 
discharged into a sewer in quantities sufficient to create a clog.”133 
However, it was the extent of the clog that won the day, with the court
stating: 
While a resident of La Junta who dumps an occasional pan of 
greasy water into a sewer may not contaminate and therefore not 
pollute the sewer, a restaurant that repeatedly dumps large
amounts of cooking grease or greasy water into a sewer over time, 
thereby creating a five- to eight-foot clog, is dumping
contaminants . . . .134 
The respondents in this matter, the two city employees, argued that the 
conclusion barring coverage would be in contradiction with the reasonable
expectations doctrine, under which a court may override even
unambiguous policy language, if that language would cause an ordinary,
objectively reasonable person to believe she was entitled to coverage.135 
In connection with that argument, the respondents explained the historic
connection between pollution exclusions and the growth of federal
environmental law. The court rejected this argument, stating they could 
not rightfully conclude that, “an ordinary reasonable person would have 
130. Kirkpatrick., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67420, at *13.
131. Roinestad v. Kirkpatrick, 300 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2010), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Nov. 18, 2010), rev’d sub nom. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Roinestad, 296 P.3d 1020 (Colo. 2013).
132. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Roinestad, 296 P.3d 1020 (Colo. 2013).
133. Id. at 1024.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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6932020] COMMENT
been “deceived” into thinking that there would be coverage for the 
dumping of cooking grease in such a great volume as to clog the sewer, as
respondents have produced no facts in this case to suggest such
deception.”136 
The Colorado Supreme Court clearly opted to apply a broad 
interpretation of the pollution exclusion by focusing on the dictionary 
definitions of the individual substances at issue and the quantities involved 
in the discharge. 
2. Maxine Furs, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.
In another seemingly unusual application of the pollution exclusion,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States applied 
Alabama law and determined that the pollution exclusion barred coverage 
where a business owner’s fur coats and shop products were soiled by the 
smell of curry.137 Maxine’s Furs (Maxine’s) is a fur shop which happened 
to be next door to an Indian Restaurant.138 Because the two businesses had 
communal air ducts, the furs and shop products at Maxine’s were exposed
to the smell of curry.139 Maxine’s had the affected furs and shop products
cleaned, and then made a claim with its property policy insurance carrier,
Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners).140 Auto-Owners
denied coverage based on the pollution exclusion clause in Maxine’s
policy.141 Maxine’s subsequently sued its insurer for breach of contract,
and the district court concluded that coverage was indeed barred and
granted summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners.142 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that curry aroma is in fact a pollutant under the 
exclusion, and the insurer is not liable to pay for the damages under the
property policy.143 In considering the applicability of curry aroma as a 
“pollutant,” the court stated:
[A] contaminant is something that “soil[s], stain[s], corrupt[s], or 
infect[s] by contact or association.” Indeed, what happened here
136. Id. at 1025. 




140. Id. Maxine’s Furs held a property policy with Auto-Owners Insurance
Company. This policy provided first party coverage to the insured, as opposed to 
the CGL’s coverage for the insured’s liability. 
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 688.
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is that the curry aroma soiled Maxine’s furs. Otherwise, they
would not have needed cleaning. We do not think that a reasonable
person could conclude otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude that
curry aroma is a pollutant under the policy.144 
Maxine’s further argued that coverage should not have been barred based
on the fact that the damage was not caused by the means specified in the
policy.145 Maxine’s contended, instead, that the damage was caused by the
“wafting” of the aroma.146 This dispersal, the court held, was no different
“than the aroma migrating, seeping, or escaping into Maxine’s and
contaminating the furs.”147 
In this case, the court applied Alabama law on insurance policy 
interpretation, which requires that policy language is found to be 
ambiguous only when it is open to different but reasonable interpretation 
by a person of ordinary intelligence within the context of the policy.148 If 
the policy is found to be ambiguous, the ambiguity is to be resolved in 
favor of the insured.149 
The court, in finding this exclusion unambiguous in its application to
the curry aroma, did not believe that, “a person of ordinary intelligence 
could reasonably conclude that curry aroma is not a contaminant under
these circumstances.”150 Thus, the court applied a broad interpretation,
barring coverage for damage caused by pollution outside of the traditional
notions of the exclusion. 
III. PRACTICAL RULES FOR IMPRACTICAL PROBLEMS
A. How Louisiana Plays the Game: Doerr Factors
The Louisiana Supreme Court is one of very few courts that has offered
factors to be considered when determining the applicability of a pollution
exclusion to a Commercial General Liability policy. Additionally, the court
has acknowledged cooperation of the Louisiana Department of Insurance will
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 687 (stating, “Maxine’s policy with Auto–Owners excludes from
coverage any damage or loss caused by ‘discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration,
release or escape . . . .’”).
146. Id. at 688.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 688 (citing Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Kirkland,
69 So. 3d 98 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co.,
817 So. 2d 687, 691–92 (Ala. 2001)).
149. Maxine Furs, Inc., 426 F. App’x at 688.
150. Id.
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6952020] COMMENT
be necessary to ensure the integrity of the regulatory process is not
undermined.
The Louisiana Supreme Court opinion, in Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
stated that the implications of this decision were far-reaching, not only for
establishing a factor test to guide judicial interpretation, but also overruled the
Ducote v. Koch Pipeline Co. decision from 1999.151 Ducote itself was seen as 
a departure from a line of well-established jurisprudence on the issue.152 
Doerr originated as a class action brought by residents of St. Bernard 
Parish for injuries caused as a result of contamination to the Parish water
supply.153 The plaintiffs alleged that the Mississippi River was
contaminated by hazardous and nonhazardous substances as the result of
emissions from the Mobil Oil Corporation wastewater facility.154 The
residents brought suit against the St. Bernard Parish government, among 
others, for injuries resulting from the use of the contaminated water.155 The 
Parish held a CGL policy with Genesis Insurance Company (Genesis) that
provided coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused by the 
Parish.156 Naturally, this policy contained a pollution exclusion.157 The 
plaintiffs added Genesis as a defendant to the suit based on the policy they
held with the St. Bernard Parish government.158 Litigation subsequently 
ensued to determine the existence and applicability of the Parish’s CGL
policy and the Pollution Exclusion contained therein.159 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana immediately recognized that the
resolution of the matter between Genesis Insurance Company and St. 
Bernard Parish hinged on the interpretation of the Commercial General
Liability policy issued to the Parish government.160 On discussion of the
approaches to policy interpretation, the court addressed the applicable 
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with interpretation of a
contract.161 Additionally, the court addressed the burden of proof that falls
on each party in litigation of this type, as well as the shifting of that 
burden.162 The insured is responsible for proving that an incident falls 
151. 774 So. 2d 119, 126 (La. 2000).
152. Id. at 132.
153. Id. at 122. 
154. Id. at 123. 
155. Id.
156. Id. at 122. 
157. Id.
158. Id. at 123.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 124–25.
162. Id. at 124. 
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within the terms of a policy when the coverage afforded is being 
questioned.163 In contrast, the applicability of a Pollution Exclusion clause 
to coverage is a burden that lies on the insurer.164 A primary consideration 
the court addressed was the absurd results allowed by the policy exclusion
when interpreted without limitation.165 
The court illustrated the absurdity allowed by broad interpretation 
providing two examples that result in the barring of coverage: bodily 
injuries suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a 
bottle of Drano and bodily injury suffered by one who has an allergic 
reaction to chlorine in a public pool.166 While Drano and chlorine can both 
be considered “irritants” or “contaminants” in certain circumstances, these
events would not be ordinarily described as pollution.167 The possibility of
such absurd results from a broad reading of the exclusion lends to the fact 
that the wording is ambiguous. Under Louisiana law, ambiguity in an
insurance policy ought to be construed in favor of the insured, to afford
coverage.168 Additionally, the court shall look to extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intent of the contracting parties in order to determine the
true meaning and interpretation of the pollution exclusion.169 The court
later looked to the origins of the pollution exclusion, including the effects 
of CERCLA, as this Comment previously discussed in detail.170 The end 
to this mean was to recognize and understand the original intent of the
clause and its applicability.
Ultimately, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that the “proper 
interpretation” of a Pollution Exclusion clause must necessarily turn on 
several considerations:
(1) whether the insured is a “polluter” within the meaning 
of the exclusion;
(2) whether the injury-causing substance is a “pollutant”
within the meaning of the exclusion; and
(3) whether there was a “discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, release, or escape” of a pollutant by the insured 






168. Id. at 125.
169. Id. 
170. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
171. Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 135. 
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6972020] COMMENT
The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed each element and the factors that 
should be considered to arrive at a reasonable conclusion. Whether the
insured is classified as a “polluter” is a determination that relies on a fact-
based analysis that encompasses “a wide variety of factors.”172 These
factors include: 
(1) the nature of the insured’s business; 
(2) whether that type of business presents a risk of
pollution; 
(3) whether the insured has a separate policy covering 
the disputed claim; 
(4) whether the insured should have known from a read 
of the exclusion that a separate policy covering pollution 
damages would be necessary for the insured’s business; 
(5) who the insurer typically insures; any other claims
made under the policy; and, 
(6) any other factor the trier of fact deems relevant to the 
conclusion.173 
To determine whether the injury-causing substance is a “pollutant,” the 
trier of fact should also consider a wide variety of factors.174 The court
noted that a variety of substances could fall within the broad definition of 
“irritants” and “contaminants” as provided in the policy.175 The court 
continued to provide examples of substances found to be pollutants under 
similar policy exclusions, which includes an array of substances that are 
not typically considered pollutants.176 
Therefore, according to the court, the trier of fact should consider the 
nature of the substance, its typical usage, the quantity of the discharge, 
whether the substance was being used for its intended purpose when the 
injury occurred, whether the substance would be considered a pollutant as 
it is generally understood, and any other factor the trier of fact deems
relevant.177 
The final fact-based conclusion is the determination of whether there





176. Id. at 135. 
177. Id.
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698 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
substance causing the injury.178 To make this determination, the trier of 
fact should “consider all relevant circumstances.”179 These relevant
circumstances should specifically include whether the pollutant was 
intentionally or negligently discharged, whether the actions of the alleged
polluter were active or passive, and any other consideration the trier of fact 
deems relevant.180 
In Doerr, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the position, and 
its importance, of the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance on the
interpretation of the pollution exclusion.181 Any insurance policy issued in 
the State of Louisiana must first be approved by the Commissioner of 
Insurance.182 In the approval process, the Commissioner is required to 
deny approval for a policy which is ambiguous in nature, or contains a 
misleading clause or exception which might be deceptive as to the risk
which is assumed in the general coverage of the policy.183 The
Commissioner approves a policy which is considered favoring the insured, 
but is prohibited from approving a policy which clearly favors the 
insurer.184 The Louisiana Department of Insurance (Department) issued an
advisory letter intended to guide insurers on the proper application of the 
Pollution Exclusion, after investigating and reviewing the matter for a 3-
year period.185 In this advisory letter, Commissioner James Brown 
addressed the inclusion of the pollution exclusion in the policies of
insureds who “do not present a pollution risk obviating the need for the
broad exclusionary language found in standard Pollution Exclusions.”186 
Brown went on to discuss the Department’s concern for the application of
the exclusion, stating:
[O]ur review has disclosed a number of incidents where the
standard Pollution Exclusions have been used to disavow
coverage even though there was no underlying pollution incident 
which would justify use of the exclusion. We are also concerned 
178. Id. at 136. 
179. Id.
180. Id. at 135. 
181. Id. at 133. 
182. Id. (referring to LA. REV. STAT. § 22:620(A)(1)) (“No insurance policy is 
permitted to be issued in this state without the prior approval of its provision by 
the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance.”). 
183. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:621(3) (2019).
184. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:623 (2019).
185. See James H. Brown, Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance, Advisory
Letter 97-01 (June 4, 1997). Doerr, 477 So. 2d at 133. 
186. See sources cited supra note 185.
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6992020] COMMENT
that the broad definition given to the term “pollutant” creates an 
opportunity for abuse. This is a particular concern as regards
commercial enterprises whose ongoing business activities do not
present a risk to the environment.187 
Further, the letter stated the appropriate application of the exclusion by 
insurers was an issue of grave concern for the Department, and that action
would be taken as necessary to assure the integrity of the regulatory process
and the proper application of the exclusion in line with its stated purpose.188 
The Louisiana Supreme Court opted to face this dividing issue head-on. 
Furthermore, the court addressed the necessity for a black-and-white test to
apply to each set of facts and created a wide array of considerations and factors
which must guide the determination.189 The court successfully analyzed the
exclusion clause, applying a narrow interpretation and considering the
importance of maintaining traditional notions of environmental pollutions.
IV. SOLUTION: ONE GAME, ONE RULEBOOK
The overwhelming amount of jurisprudence surrounding this topic
suggests that a bright-line, uniform interpretation is desperately needed by 
policyholders, insurers, and the judicial system. Inconsistent construction 
and interpretation leave the insured unsure of their coverage and unable to
tailor their business activities to their liability. The insurance industry is
massive, extensively organized, and legislatively exempt from most 
antitrust laws. To prevent the industry from taking advantage of consumers
and protect the interests of policyholders, the court system must recognize 
and employ the well-recognized contract principles. Therefore, to equip
all parties involved in the insurer-insured relationship, the courts of the 
United States should adopt the three-factor test developed by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp.190 In furtherance of this
uniformity, it is imperative that the insurance industry regulators strictly
monitor the application of the pollution exclusion, to ensure its rightful
and fair use. 
Uniform application of the Doerr test is the appropriate solution for a
multitude of reasons. Not only is a narrow interpretation (“first camp”) the
most common-sense solution, but the Doerr factors provide a holistic
framework of considerations for equitable and fair adjudication. 
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 135.
190. See discussion supra Part III.
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A. Doerr Factors
The factors that the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted are essential in 
the interpretation of a pollution exclusion when applying to the facts of a
particular occurrence are ones which consider many contract interpretation 
doctrines and principles.191 As discussed previously, the doctrine of 
reasonable expectation considers the expectations of the insured with
regard to the coverage options they possess under their policy period.192 
By determining whether the insured is a “polluter” within the meaning of
the clause, the court considers the expectations of the insured and whether 
they may classify themselves as a business possibly excluded from this
type of coverage.193 It is clear the court attempted to narrow the
“expectation gap” between the insured and insurers based on the
considerations that the court determined to be necessary.194 By taking the
nature of the insured’s business, the insured’s additional pollution 
coverage, and the business’s risk of pollution into account, the test applies 
the doctrine of reasonable expectation and ensures that consumers have a
basic understanding of their coverage.195 
The second factor of this three-part test encompasses the intent of the
Pollution Exclusion clause, as originally drafted.196 When applying the
facts of an occurrence to the terms of the pollution exclusion, this test
requires a fact-based inquiry into whether the injury-causing substance is
a “pollutant” within the meaning of the exclusion.197 When courts across
the country deny coverage for the discharge of cooking grease, carbon 
monoxide, and condensation because they are pollutants, it is clear that
this element is a vital consideration to maintain the original purpose of this 
exclusion.198 The pollution exclusion addresses the monumental liability 
associated with serious contamination of actual pollutants into our
environment.199 This test is beneficial in application of this understanding,
and considering the nature of the substance, its typical usage and whether 
it is one that would typically be considered a pollutant.200 By narrowing 
the class of substance to those which are “pollutants” under these strict
191. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 139 (La. 2000).
192. See discussion supra Part II.
193. Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 138.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See discussion supra Part I.
197. Doerr, 774 So. 2d. at 140.
198. Id
199. Id. at 141.
200. Id.
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considerations, the Doerr test is maintaining the integrity and purpose of
this exclusionary clause. 
The third and final step is the fact-based determination of whether 
there was a “discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape” is
important for ensuring the pollutant was released in such a way that 
actually qualifies as “pollution.”201 For example, this factor does not bar
coverage for Drano which has spilled on the floor of a supermarket.202 By
considering the method of dispersion which led to the injury, this three-
part test eliminates the absurd results reached by courts nationwide by 
ensuring each injury requiring coverage is the result of pollution and aligns
with the meaning of the exclusion.
The Doerr test is in no way a perfect test for analyzing the meaning of
a Pollution Exclusion clause. However, this framework offers an attempt 
to close the expectation gap and provide guidance to courts faced with a 
question of coverage under the Pollution Exclusion. While other courts 
across the country have attempted to confront this problem, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court offered the most comprehensive, narrow analysis. 
B. Insurance Commissioners
In order to fully implement a uniform interpretation throughout the 
court system, as well as the insurance industry, it is crucial that the industry 
regulators encourage and enforce a fair and equitable application of the 
Pollution Exclusion. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Doerr addressed the
position of the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance, evidenced through 
an advisory letter issued, and took this position into consideration when
the decision was rendered.203 Commissioners across the country should
offer guidance to insurers issuing policies within their state on accepted
application of the exclusion, as well as a claim to take action if it is found 
that insurers are applying this clause too broadly. The National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners should provide additional
guidance to these insurance carriers to encourage a more consistent 
application of the exclusion clause between jurisdictions.204 Ultimately, it
201. Id. at 143.
202. See Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d
1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
203. Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 138.
204. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is an organization 
made up of state insurance commissioners from across the country. This association
is the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support organization governed by the
chief insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S.
territories. Through the NAIC, state insurance regulators establish standards and 
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is important that the industry regulators demand uniformity and fairness
for the sake of the consumer. 
CONCLUSION
The insurance industry uses the Pollution Exclusion as a shield, 
protecting their massive assets at the detriment of unknowing 
policyholders. Unfortunately, the judicial system effectuates this abuse by
denying coverage to the insureds who have no way of knowing their
actions constitute pollution. State courts continue to exacerbate this 
problem, ultimately widening the expectation gap between insurers and
insureds. To maintain the integrity of CERCLA and the progressive
environmental movement, it is imperative that courts across the country 
refuse to allow the broad application of the Pollution Exclusion attempted 
by insurance carriers. This Comment addressed the considerations that 
must drive a court’s analysis when determining the presence of coverage 
for an injury which an insurer is claiming was the result of pollution. In 
furtherance of fairness to the consumer, honesty among insurers, and the
purpose of the Pollution Exclusion, a uniform interpretation employing the
three-part test developed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Doerr v.
Mobil Oil Corporation is the most pragmatic solution.
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